The New York-New Jersey Boundary Controversy: John Marshall and the Nullification Crisis by Birkner, Michael J.
History Faculty Publications History
Summer 1992
The New York-New Jersey Boundary Controversy:
John Marshall and the Nullification Crisis
Michael J. Birkner
Gettysburg College
Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac
Part of the Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons
Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.
This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of
the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac/31
This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an
authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact cupola@gettysburg.edu.
Birkner, Michael J. The New York-New Jersey Boundary Controversy: John Marshall and the Nullification Crisis. Journal of the Early
Republic. 1992. 12(2): 195-212.
The New York-New Jersey Boundary Controversy: John Marshall and the
Nullification Crisis
Abstract
In 1832 a long-standing boundary dispute between New York and New Jersey complicated the work of Chief
Justice John Marshall and President Andrew Jackson. Long reviled by southern states' rights advocates,
including the president, Marshall in 1832 faced the prospect of having the Court's decisions ignored by the
state of Georgia. Federal authority was further challenged in the fall of 1832, when South Carolina nullified
the tariff of 1828, thereby provoking a constitutional crisis. On December 10, 1832, to the amazement of
many observers, Jackson issued a proclamation rejecting nullification and secession, and threatening military
action if South Carolina did not change its course.
Keywords
New York, New Jersey, John Marshall, Andrew Jackson, nullification crisis
Disciplines
History | Political History | United States History
This article is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac/31
THE NEW YORK-NEW 
JERSEY BOUNDARY 
CONTROVERSY, JOHN 
MARSHALL AND THE 
NULLIFICATION CRISIS 
Michael J. Birkner 
In 1832 a long-standing boundary dispute between New York and 
New Jersey complicated the work of Chief Justice John Marshall and 
President Andrew Jackson. Long reviled by southern states' rights 
advocates, including the president, Marshall in 1832 faced the prospect 
of having the Court's decisions ignored by the state of Georgia. Federal 
authority was further challenged in the fall of 1832, when South 
Carolina nullified the tariff of 1828, thereby provoking a constitutional 
crisis. On December 10, 1832, to the amazement of many observers, 
Jackson issued a proclamation rejecting nullification and secession, and 
threatening military action if South Carolina did not change its 
course.1 
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Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the 
Nullification Crisis (New York 1987), and William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The 
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York 1965), are the two best, 
albeit competing, comprehensive accounts of the nullification crisis. For a vivid 
delineation of the crisis from Jackson's viewpoint, see Robert V. Remini, Andrew 
Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845 (New York 1984), chs. 2-3. 
Important works that frame their interpretations independently of Ellis but nonetheless 
share Ellis's emphasis on the ambiguous outcome of the crisis include Merrill D. 
Peterson, Olive Branch and Sword. The Compromise of 1833 (Baton Rouge 1982), esp. ch. 
4; and Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York 
1990), esp. 128-131. 
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During the winter of 1832-1833, as Jackson attempted to crush 
South Carolina's "treason," his political allies labored behind the 
scenes to insure that Georgia's concurrent challenge to the Marshall 
Court would not undercut the president's position. Ironically enough, 
some of the same people who sought to defuse the Cherokee crisis, 
including Vice President elect Martin Van Buren, were identified with 
a legal position in a case pending before the Court that echoed 
Georgia's position in the Cherokee cases.2 That case involved a long- 
standing argument between New York and neighboring New Jersey 
over boundaries and possession of Staten Island. Quite unexpectedly to 
all parties concerned, the New York-New Jersey suit became enmeshed 
in a complex political and constitutional showdown. It had potentially 
disastrous implications for the Jacksonian political coalition and 
threatened the president's ability to enforce federal law in South 
Carolina. 
Resolving the New York-New Jersey controversy quickly became a 
necessary quest of leading New York Jacksonians. By compromising 
the boundary question at the same time that they sidetracked a 
constitutional confrontation between Georgia and the federal 
government, Van Buren and his allies helped clear the field for a tariff 
compromise that was grudgingly accepted by all parties. The 
nullification crisis ended, if not on a note of high triumph for Andrew 
Jackson, at least with federal authority and presidential prestige intact.3 
2 For a recent reassessment of Georgia and the Cherokees, see Mary Young, 
"The Exercise of Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia," Journal of the Early Republic, 10 
(Spring 1990), 43-63. Edwin A. Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision: Worcester v.
Georgia and the Nullification Crisis," Journal of Southern History, 39 (Nov. 1973), 519- 
544, offers a penetrating analysis of the Jackson administration's efforts to avoid a 
confrontation between'Georgia and federal authority. See Ellis, Union at Risk, ch. 7. 
3 Until recently, most scholars portrayed the nullification crisis as a Jacksonian 
triumph. But as Richard Ellis argued in his important revisionist study, Jackson's 
"victory" over the nullificationists was largely illusory. The president's nationalism did 
not rally all Democrats to his banner. Moreover, the legislative compromise that ended 
the crisis left nullifiers "secure and unrepentant," and states' rights theory became 
"fatefully entwined with the concepts of slavery and secession." Ellis, Union at Risk, ix. 
Ellis's argument earned widely favorable reviews, including one from Jackson 
biographer Robert Remini, despite the fact that in key respects Ellis was reviving and 
expanding arguments originally made in 1949 by Charles M. Wiltse in his highly 
sympathetic Calhoun biography, John C. Calhoun. Nullifier, 1829-1839 (Indianapolis 
1949), chs. 13-15. For Remini's positive assessment of Ellis, see Civil War History, 34 
(Mar. 1988), 84-86. 
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The boundary dispute had deep roots in colonial history. It was made 
more difficult by the extraordinary vagueness of early crown grants 
and the simple fact that, at bottom, "no one knew where the New 
Jersey-New York border was.'4 New Jersey had originally been part of 
the grant given to James, Duke of York, by his brother Charles II in 
1664, embracing also the larger jurisdiction of New York. James soon 
thereafter conveyed his stake in New Jersey to two friends and 
supporters, Sir George Carteret and Lord John Berkeley. Exactly what 
James had granted to Carteret and Berkeley was from the beginning a 
matter of dispute. Had he granted the power of government along with 
control over land? Did the grant include the largely uninhabited Staten 
Island, and other, smaller islands that hugged the Jersey shoreline? 
What did James mean by setting the northwestern boundary between 
the two colonies at 41 ?40' of latitude and the northernmost branch of 
the Delaware River? (Later survey work demonstrated that these were 
in fact two different places.) What did James mean by the Hudson 
River as the dividing line between New York and New Jersey? Did the 
Hudson River encompass the Arthur Kill, between mainland New 
Jersey and Staten Island?5 
Sharp disagreements on these questions bedeviled the two 
jurisdictions for one hundred and fifty years. With its wealth and 
population advantage, New York held the strong hand in the dispute, 
essentially daring New Jersey to deny its claims to the high water mark 
on the Jersey shore, to build wharves and issue summons up to that 
point, to regulate commerce on the Hudson south into the Arthur Kill 
that separated Staten Island from the mainland, and to hold on to 
several islands that, from any logical map construction, should have 
been part of New Jersey rather than New York. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, lackluster negotiations 
alternated with unneighborly behavior between New York and New 
Jersey. Conflicts continued into the 1830s. New Jersey became 
increasingly assertive after 1800, as it resisted New York's grant of a 
steamboat monopoly to the Fulton-Livingston interest, and on three 
occasions initiated commissions to resolve the outstanding 
disagreements over Staten Island and related boundary disagreements. 
4 Philip J. Schwarz, The Jarring Interests: New York's Boundary Makers, 1664-1776 
(Albany, N.Y. 1979), 81. 
5 Material from this and subsequent paragraphs are derived from Michael J. 
Birkner, "State Wrongs and States' Rights: The New York/New Jersey Boundary 
Controversy," unpublished paper delivered at the Seminar on New Jersey History, 
Princeton University, March 29, 1989. 
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None of these efforts yielded a satisfactory settlement, primarily 
because New York was uninterested in compromise and felt no 
pressing need to assuage the smaller state. When New Jersey 
attempted to involve the federal government in the controversy, 
through congressional mediation, and indirectly in a steamboat case 
that in 1824 set an important legal precedent, the results were mixed. 
In Gibbons v. Ogden, rooted in New Jersey's opposition to a New York 
steamboat monopoly on the Hudson, the Marshall Court quashed New 
York's claims to control interstate commerce. But the case had no 
bearing on outstanding boundary questions between the two states.6 
Congress, moreover, refused New Jersey's bid for intervention on 
behalf of a boundary settlement.7 
At least one historian, Herbert Johnson, has recognized the 
connection between New York's "exaggerated" notions of its own 
sovereignty in its general relations with New Jersey and the specific 
points surrounding the steamboat case. Although New York 
infrequently acted on its formal claims to sovereignty up to the high 
water mark on the New Jersey shore, it continued to assert them in 
negotiations and various public forums. New York also occasionally 
aggravated New Jersey sensibilities by its expansive interpretation of 
oystering rights on the Jersey shore and occasional assertions of police 
power in the smaller state. Such aggressiveness, Johnson has argued, 
"would not long be tolerated in a federal union." John Marshall's 
famous opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, in this context, was not simply the 
resolution of a federal-state conflict, but also was intended to 
6 Many sources trace the origins of the two states' steamboat rivalry, which led 
ultimately to the Marshall Court's influential decision in Gibbons v. Ogden. Two recent 
accounts of the controversy's early stages are Michael Birkner, "Samuel L. Southard 
and the Origins of Gibbons v. Ogden," Princeton University Library Chronicle, 40 (Winter 
1979), 171-182; and Herbert A. Johnson, "Gibbons v. Ogden Before Marshall," in 
Courts and Law in Early New York: Selected Essays, ed. Leo Hershkowitz and Milton M. 
Klein (Port Washington, N.Y. 1978), 105-113. 
7 Details on New Jersey's bid to involve Congress are recounted in Michael 
Birkner, Samuel L. Southard: Jeffersonian Whig (Rutherford, N.J. 1984), 56; and Annals of 
Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., 390, 394. A copy of New Jersey Senator Mahlon 
Dickerson's bill, introduced in the Senate on January 10, 1822, is in the Samuel L. 
Southard Papers (Manuscript Department, Firestone Library, Princeton University). 
New York's states' rights position in the 1822 Congressional debate and subsequently 
in legal briefs marked a shift from its proclivity in the late eighteenth century to appeal 
in disputes with neighboring states to higher authority. See Peter S. Onuf, The Origins 
of the Federal Republic. Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787 
(Philadelphia 1983), 108-109. Onuf does not discuss New York's boundary disputes 
with New Jersey. 
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"eliminate the likelihood of interstate clashes based upon excessively 
optimistic assessments of state political powers over navigable waters."8 
Gibbons v. Ogden, however, did nothing to relieve New Jersey's 
distress over New York's refusal to resolve boundary and related 
controversies. On several occasions, following disputes over actions of 
New York constables serving process or making arrests across state 
lines, New Jersey's remonstrances provoked formal negotiations. In 
1807, 1826, and again in 1828, commissioners appointed by the 
governors of the two states met and discussed the eastern boundary 
question, without reaching any mutually agreeable compromise. The 
New Yorkers refused to renounce or ease their claims to the high water 
mark on the New Jersey shore, including, as the New Jersey 
commissioners noted in 1807, "shores, roads, and harbors entirely 
within the natural territorial limits of New Jersey." Nor would the 
New Jersey delegations abandon their state's claim to jurisdiction up to 
the midway point of waters conjoining the two states.9 
In the wake of several border incidents and yet another failed 
negotiation with New York in 1828, Jersey officials reached the end of 
their patience. In the summer of 1828, New Jersey Governor Isaac 
Williamson authorized state Attorney General Theodore Frelinghuysen 
to bring a bill of complaint against New York before the United States 
Supreme Court, requiring that New York appear before the Court in 
equity proceedings.10 Frelinghuysen did some of this work, but in late 
January 1829 was elected to the United States Senate, after which time 
he became a secondary figure in the suit. 
8 Johnson, "Gibbons v. Ogden Before Marshall," 112. 9 Report of the [New Jersey] Committee on the Correspondence Between Governor Clinton 
and Governor Williamson Touching the Arrest of a Ministerial Officer, of New-York ... 
(Trenton, N.J. 1826), 3. Copies of background material used by the New York 
Commissioners in the 1807 negotiations are in New York Boundary Papers (New-York 
Historical Society, New York City), vol. 4. For a summary of New Jersey's efforts in 
1806-1807, 1818, and 1826-1827 to reach some accommodation with New York on the 
boundary issue, see William A. Whitehead, "Eastern Boundary of New Jersey: A 
Review of a Paper on the Waters of New Jersey, Read Before the Historical Society of 
New York, by the Hon. John Cochrane, and a Rejoinder to the Reply of 'A Member 
of the New York Historical Society'," Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society, 10 
(1865), 108-110. 10 See, for example, John Rutherfurd to Richard Stockton, Sept. 24, 1827, in 
Papers Referring to the Negotiations in 1827 (New Jersey Historical Society, Newark). 
Also see Gov. Williamson, "Special Message to the Legislature," Feb. 1828, Southard 
Papers. For New York's position, see "Report of the Commissioners of New York, 
Relative to the Boundary Line Between This State and the State of New Jersey," Jan. 
26, 1828, New York Senate Document no. 74. See also Rutherfurd, "Memo on the 
Boundary Dispute," [1827], Southard Papers. A printed copy of Frelinghuysen's brief, 
which includes a long historical analysis of New Jersey's claims to the middle of the 
waters between the two states, is available, untitled, in the Southard Papers. 
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Frelinghuysen's successor as attorney general, Samuel L. Southard, 
soon called on his colleague in the cabinets of James Monroe and John 
Quincy Adams, William Wirt of Maryland, to assume the major 
responsibility for the New Jersey case. Not merely a first rate litigator, 
Wirt would later become engaged in two prominent Georgia cases 
before the Supreme Court--Worcester v. Georgia and Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia-that raised legal issues nearly identical to those in the New 
York-New Jersey dispute.'1 If New Jersey was serious about its claims, 
Southard believed, Wirt was the ideal person to argue their merits 
before the Marshall Supreme Court. Wirt accepted Southard's 
invitation. 
Like Frelinghuysen, Wirt based his argument on the twenty-fifth 
section of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which provided that the Court could 
resolve jurisdictional disputes between states. New York authorities, 
however, refused to participate in the suit; they even deliberately 
avoided subpoenas served by representatives of the New Jersey 
attorney general. When the subpoenas were finally served by a New 
Jersey marshall, after a sustained and often frustrating effort, New 
York's attorney general, Greene C. Bronson, declined to honor it on 
the grounds that the United States Supreme Court had no jurisdiction 
to hear the case.12 
Such intransigence did not deter Southard or Wirt, who believed 
that the larger state's defiance would spur the Court to order New 
York's appearance. If New York remained obdurate, the Court could 
issue a decree ex parte, a point Southard made to New York Governor 
Enos Throop and Attorney General Bronson early in 1830.13 In his 
correspondence with the New York officials, Southard made no overt 
" Marvin R. Cain, "William Wirt Against Andrew Jackson: Reflections on An 
Era," Mid-America, 47 (Apr. 1965), 122-123. Wirt was retained as counsel for New 
Jersey while still attorney general of the United States. On this, see Wirt to Southard, 
Feb. 8, 1832, Southard Papers. 
12 Samuel Southard's correspondence between 1829 and 1831 includes many 
letters and documents relating to efforts to serve a legally binding subpoena on the New 
York attorney general and other Empire State officials. See particularly correspondence 
between Southard and Wirt, Southard and Supreme Court clerk William Carroll, and 
Southard and New York Marshall J.W. Livingston in 1829 and 1830, Southard 
Papers. On the attempts by New York attorney general to evade subpoenas, see the 
papers cited above, and Ellis, Union At Risk, 144. Bronson's argument may be found in 
printed form in Box 139, Southard Papers. See also the precis of his argument as of 
early 1832, "Points for the Defendant," ibid. 
13 Southard to Enos Throop and Greene C. Bronson, Jan. 12, 1830, Southard 
Additional Papers. 
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mention of the Supreme Court's current composition, which 
presumably would favor New Jersey's position against New York's 
firm states' rights assertions, nor of a well-set precedent for acceptance 
of the Court's role as arbiter in federal-state disputes. But surely 
Southard had such matters in mind as he wrote to Throop and 
Bronson, and almost as certain he assumed the New Yorkers did, too.14 
If Throop and Bronson were intimidated by Southard's actions, 
they well disguised it. When Southard and Wirt appeared before the 
Supreme Court on March 6, 1830, New York sent no opposing 
counsel. Bronson had earlier written to Chief Justice John Marshall 
arguing that the Supreme Court should not and could not interfere in 
'"controversies between two or more states." Marshall rejected this 
reasoning, and issued a subpoena commanding New York's 
participation. When the New Yorkers failed to show up in court for a 
second time in January 1831, Wirt requested that the case be heard 
without New York's participation. Marshall granted the request for an 
ex parte proceeding, thereby lending the case a new significance as a test 
of wills between a powerful state and the Marshall Court at the very 
moment the Court was moving to reject Georgia's assertions of state 
sovereignty in its efforts to evict the Cherokee Indians from its 
borders.15 
Despite the New Yorkers' rejection of Court jurisdiction in the 
boundary controversy, they did eventually participate in New Jersey v. 
New York, if only to emphasize their states' rights position. In the first 
week of March 1832, Attorney General Bronson was joined in 
Washington by another leader of the Albany Regency, Benjamin F. 
Butler. Both men were prepared to insist that the Court had no 
standing in the case. Such a position was strikingly similar to that 
made by Georgia's counsel in Worcester v. Georgia, which was argued 
before the Marshall Court only days earlier, and decided by the Court 
on March 3, just as Bronson and Butler arrived in the capital.16 
14 For an authoritative account of the Marshall Court's views on sovereignty 
issues, see G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 (New 
York 1988), ch. 8. Relevant here is John R. Schmidhauser, "'States' Rights' and the 
Origins of the Supreme Court's Power as Arbiter in Federal-State Relations," Wayne 
Law Review, 4 (Spring 1958), 101-114. 
15 White, Marshall Court, 703-740. See also Ellis, Union At Risk, 102-122, passim; 
and New Jersey v. New York, 4 Peters 284 (1831). For New York State as an "energetic 
and forceful" proponent of states' rights in the early 1830s, see Ellis, Union at Risk, 
144-145. Ellis discusses New Jersey v. New York only briefly, but his treatment 
illuminates the difficulties facing the Marshall Court at this time. 
16 Worcester focused on a Georgia law of 1830 that prohibited white men from 
entering Cherokee territory after March 1, 1831 without a state license. The Marshall 
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Andrew Jackson had made clear his sympathies for Georgia's 
position in relation to the Cherokees, and had left more than one 
member of the Supreme Court unsure whether he would sustain any 
decree against Georgia that the Court might issue. New York's official 
position in 1832, in this context, was easy to read: Why not put John 
Marshall in the position of rendering a verdict that yet another 
important state might choose to ignore?17 With New York following 
Georgia's lead in challenging the Court, the constitutional climate in 
the United States appeared unfavorable for nationalist-minded citizens. 
Working on parallel tracks, it seemed likely that New York and 
Georgia would frustrate John Marshall's jurisprudence and revive the 
doctrine of sovereign states. That the nullification crisis would put such 
an aggressive strategy in disrepute with Andrew Jackson could not 
have been foreseen. 
Political considerations were not lost on the sagacious chief justice. 
Although it is impossible to know what Marshall was thinking as 
counsel for New York and New Jersey reached Washington, the record 
shows that he surprised New Jersey's lawyers, Southard and Wirt. 
Marshall did not affirm their position; indeed, he declined even to hear 
it. On the morning of March 14, following Bronson's day-long 
argument against the Court's jurisdiction, and before Wirt had a 
chance to make his argument (with which Marshall would be familiar, 
since he had heard Wirt present a version of it in Worcester v. Georgia), 
Marshall announced that "the court saw that the cause could not be 
decided this term, if the argument was completed, & that they had 
therefore come to the conclusion that the argument should be 
postponed" until February 1833.18 
Court held this statute unconstitutional, a decision Georgia showed no signs of 
accepting. See Bronson's argument cited in n. 12; Joseph C. Burke, "The Cherokee 
Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality," Stanford Law Review, 21 (Feb. 1969), 
500-531; and Anton-Hermann Chroust, "Did President Jackson Actually Threaten the 
Supreme Court of the United States with Nonenforcement of Its Injunction Against the 
State of Georgia?" The American Journal of Legal History, 4 (1960), 76-78. Robert V. 
Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832 (New York 1981), 
276-278, argues that Jackson acted with great discretion in response to Marshall's 
decision in Worcester v. Georgia, but concedes that the president "encouraged Georgia in 
its intransigence." For a similar argument, See Ellis, Union at Risk, 32. 
17 Marshall's discomfort at this time is captured in Charles Warren, The Supreme 
Court in United States History (1922; rev. ed., 2 vols., Boston 1926), I, 769-772. See also 
White, The Marshall Court, 959-996. 
18 New Jersey v. New York, 3 Peters 461 (1830), 5 Peters 284 (1831). 
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Why Marshall acted as he did remains a matter of doubt. At least 
one contemporary newspaper opinion-writer believed that the chief 
justice was affected by the compelling nature of Bronson's argument. 
"I understand from good authority," an anonymous correspondent for 
the New York Courier wrote, "that the array of names and authorities 
in favor of the ground assumed by the Attorney-General of New York, 
startled, in no small degree, the Supreme Bench, particularly the Chief 
Justice."'9 Bronson had claimed, consistent with earlier arguments, 
that the Court had no jurisdiction in this case, observing that Congress 
had not furnished "the means by which the judicial power shall be 
carried into execution." He added that the New York-New Jersey 
boundary dispute was at bottom political, not judicial, in its nature.20 
There was nothing especially compelling in Bronson's argument. 
The Courier piece to the contrary notwithstanding, John Marshall was 
probably less impressed by the quality of Bronson's presentation than 
by the force with which New York was expressing a hard-edged states' 
rights position, barely a week after Marshall had pronounced Georgia's 
position in Worcester v. Georgza to be constitutionally untenable.21 
Timing and substance, not brilliance on the part of New York's 
counsel, brought the chief justice up short. The Georgia and New York 
cases threatened the Court's standing because there was no likelihood 
that either Georgia or New York would voluntarily submit to an 
adverse ruling by the Court-or for that matter, that President Jackson 
could require them to do so. In what appears to have been a thinly 
veiled allusion to these cases, Marshall wrote his friend Joseph Story in 
September 1832 that he had become convinced that the Constitution 
"6cannot last." Not only were southern states challenging :federal 
19 For Butler's participation in and view of the case, see William D. Driscoll, 
Benjamin F. Butler: Lawyer and Regency Politician (New York 1987), 220-226 (quotation at 
225). Based on a comparison of Butler's letters to his wife and the argument in the 
Courier, Butler himself may have written and planted that piece. Whether that is the 
case or not, not everyone saw Bronson's argument as powerful. William Wirt, for 
example, dismissed it as claptrap. He told his co-counsel, Samuel Southard, that had 
he had the chance to rebut Bronson, he "would have demolished him." Wirt to 
Southard, May 29, 1833, Southard Papers. 
20 Bronson and Butler, "Points for the Defendant." 
21 On the legal and political complications caused by Georgia's emphatic states' 
rights position in the Cherokee cases, the best analysis is that of Edwin Miles. He 
points out that because of technicalities inherent in administering cases like Worcester v. 
Georgia, in 1832 the Court could not assure immediate compliance with its judgment in 
favor of Worcester and his Indian allies; Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision," 
527-530. See also Burke, "The Cherokee Cases," 529-530. 
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jurisdiction on crucial issues, but the North was not nearly so united 
against both states as Marshall had long assumed. "I had supposed," 
he wrote, "that North of the Potomack a firm and solid government 
competent to the security of rational liberty might be preserved. Even 
that now seems doubtful .... The Union has been prolonged thus far 
by miracles. I fear they cannot continue."22 
In this context, it seems fair to speculate that Marshall's decision to 
postpone the New York-New Jersey case lay in hopes, however feeble, 
that respect for the Court might somehow be more vibrant in 1833 
than it was in 1832. All he could expect with a judgment against New 
York at this time was New York's emphatic refusal to comply-which 
of course would strengthen Georgia's own determination to resist the 
Court's directives. It is even possible, as James Brown Scott has 
argued, that Marshall feared a strong opinion against New York would 
provoke "a further amendment to the Constitution withdrawing the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in such cases, as happened in the 
case of suits by individuals against the states."23 Such a proposal had 
been introduced by southern members of the House of Representatives 
in 1830, and had been endorsed by the House Judiciary Committee, 
before being defeated in the full House in January 1831.24 A year later 
Marshall had every reason to believe the idea was more dormant than 
dead. Whatever Marshall's reasoning in postponing the New York- 
New Jersey case, two facts stood: first, a nationalist interpretation of 
the Constitution faced serious challenges; and second, the two northern 
states were not an inch closer to settling their long-standing dispute. 
The impasse between New York and New Jersey might have 
continued but for a strange coincidence. In June, 1832, several months 
22 Marshall to Joseph Story, Sept. 22, 1832, quoted in Warren, Supreme Court, I, 
769. Benjamin Butler's opinion on the matter overlapped the two approaches. In letters 
written to his wife Harriet, Butler consistently emphasized the force of Bronson's 
argument; but he also suggested that Marshall had postponed the case because, 
recognizing that the South rejected his decision in Worcester v. Georgia, he did not wish 
to risk provoking a new attack on the Court, this one from a powerful northern state. 
See Butler to Harriet Butler, Mar. 3, 14, 1832, Benjamin Butler Papers (New York State Library, Albany, N.Y.). 
23 James Brown Scott, Judicial Settlement of Controversies Between States of the American 
Union. An Analysis of Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the United States (Oxford, Eng. 
1919), 116. Burke, "Cherokee Cases," 530-531, argues that Marshall was mainly 
concerned to sustain the integrity and prestige of the Court. 
24 "The Committee on the Judiciary . . . to Inquire into the Expediency of 
Repealing or Modifying the Twenty-Fifth Section . . .," House Reports, 21st Cong., 2d 
sess., no. 43; Thomas Hart Benton, Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, From 1789 to 1856 (16 vols., New York 1857-1861), XI, 300-302, 304-305. 
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after Marshall put the boundary case in legal limbo, one of New 
Jersey's representatives in the failed 1828 negotiation, John 
Rutherfurd, was traveling by steamboat to Albany when he espied 
New York's Benjamin F. Butler, co-counsel for his state in the 
Supreme Court proceeding. In a letter to Democratic Governor Peter 
D. Vroom, Rutherfurd discussed what transpired: 
Mr. B[utler] began [our conversation] regretting the existence of the 
controversy, and especially his great desire that an amicable 
settlement should take place. I of course accorded with these 
sentiments when he stated that if the least intimation was made by 
Gov[ernor] Vroom in a letter to Gov[ernor] Throop of a desire for 
an amicable settlement that he was confident Gov[ernor] T[hroop] 
would make a communication to the legislature of the state which 
would be in session in a few days, and that a law would immediately 
pass appointing commissioners to confer with others to be appointed 
by New Jersey for an adjustment of all unsettled matters .... 
Rutherfurd had responded favorably to these remarks, but he made no 
promises about what New Jersey would do if New York, as Butler 
suggested, agreed to appoint yet another commission to negotiate with 
New Jersey. On his return home, Rutherfurd told Vroom about the 
conversation, and offered a little advice. "It would be more 
advantageous for us," he wrote, "to decline any proposition, for an 
accommodation, until after we had an opportunity of spreading our 
case of ancient boundary before the public, and stating the hardships 
and injustice N[ew] Jersey had sustained while a proprietary and 
colonial government . . . thus interesting the public in our favour." At 
the same time, he noted that Butler was next to Martin Van Buren 
"the most influential man" in the New York Democratic party. With 
Van Buren in Washington, Rutherfurd wrote, Butler was the person to 
deal with if Vroom wished to see movement on this matter.25 
Vroom immediately wrote to Rutherfurd expressing his thanks. He 
then contacted Attorney General Southard, to whom he sent a copy of 
Rutherfurd's letter. What, Vroom asked, did Southard think?26 
Southard proved open-minded, if not optimistic, about a settlement. 
25 Rutherfurd to Vroom, June 10, 1832, Southard Papers. Governor Vroom 
evidently passed the letter on to Southard who, as attorney general, was responsible for 
the state's lawsuit against New York. It should be noted that Butler's friendly private 
communication contrasted sharply with a strong states' rights slant in public speeches 
he made in the fall of 1832. Driscoll, Butler, 226-227. 
26 Vroom to Southard, June 25, 1832, Southard Papers. 
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His main concern, as expressed to Vroom, was that New Jersey not be 
in the position of making the first move. "I do not well see," he wrote 
to Vroom, "how you could make a communication on the subject. We 
have always, heretofore, been the applying party-and have not always 
been very courteously answered. All our efforts at accommodation 
have failed. N[ew] Y[ork] knows perfectly well that we are . . . anxious 
to meet her in the way of compromise, and I see no appearance in any 
public act that she has the same disposition." Southard added: "We 
were driven to our suit-and every effort on [New York's] part has been 
made to procrastinate & baffle us. In our present situation, therefore, I 
do not see how you can apply-but if N[ew] Y[ork] wishes to 
compromise-she can, without loss of feeling or interest of any kind, make 
the offer to us." Southard then explained the procedure by which this 
could be accomplished-namely, some formal communication from a 
New York official addressed either to him or to Vroom.27 
When Vroom followed Southard's advice, New York Jacksonians 
proved ready to respond in kind. Butler had apparently been speaking 
only for himself when he told Rutherfurd he was interested in meeting 
New Jersey halfway. But with the end of the presidential election 
campaign in early November, and the firebell of South Carolina's 
nullification doctrine ringing loudly in Jacksonian ears, there was more 
incentive to settle the dispute with New Jersey. Michael Hoffmann, a 
congressman from Herkimer and stalwart Regency politician, made 
this point to Martin Van Buren. It was, he told Van Buren on 
November 12, 1832, "of great importance" to "secure the good will of 
New Jersey towards the state of New York." Hoffmann said he did not 
expect New York to win the suit presently before the Supreme Court. 
But "while the bill [in court] is pending and the question of jurisdiction 
is undecided, there is hope-and now is our time to settle the dispute." 
Van Buren, he said, should speak to Governor-elect William Marcy 
and find a "mode" to bring the case to an amicable close.28 
Hoffmann's letter is the only extant document that directly 
expresses Regency leaders' anxiety over their dispute with New Jersey, 
and even it does not tie New York's desire for a settlement directly to 
the problem of nullification. It seems logical, however, to make that 
connection. Martin Van Buren was a canny politician. The 
nullification crisis with South Carolina threatened the Jacksonian 
27 Southard to Vroom, June 28, 1832, ibid. 
28 Hoffmann to Van Buren, Nov. 12, 1832, Martin Van Buren Papers (Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 
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coalition and it threatened Van Buren's standing in the South for 1836 
should he speak out against Calhoun and his allies. The situation 
became especially alarming in light of President Jackson's forceful 
antinullification proclamation of December 10. As vice president elect, 
Martin Van Buren owed fealty to Jackson; but Van Buren also 
believed that strict construction of the Constitution and Jackson's 
current pronouncements were incompatible-not to mention his fear 
that Virginia might well side with the nullifiers if push came to shove.29 
Consequently, as Van Buren and his political allies worked to 
defuse the Cherokee Crisis in Georgia, he evidently told Governor-elect 
William L. Marcy in Albany that the New Jersey case had to be 
resolved as soon as possible, out of court. Van Buren doubtless hoped 
to get things moving before the end of the year, while Jacksonians still 
controlled the machinery of government in New Jersey. But he was 
prepared to move for a compromise regardless of who held power in 
that state.30 
Subsequently, in his first message to the legislature, Marcy 
formally announced on January 2, 1833, that "the interests of both 
states" would better be served by a privately negotiated compromise 
than by protracted legal action.31 This was followed by Marcy's 
promise of a good-faith effort by New York to resolve all pending 
issues. Nine days later, William Wirt addressed a long, confidential 
letter to Governor-elect Southard explaining why New Jersey should 
accept this overture-a letter that in critical respects mirrored Michael 
Hoffmann's recent letter to Van Buren in its pessimistic assessment of 
the Court's likely disposition of the boundary dispute. 
But why should New Jersey now compromise, given that the 
Supreme Court had been consistently unsympathetic to states' rights 
29 See Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision," 535-537; Donald B. Cole, 
Martin Van Buren and the American Political System (Princeton 1984), 238-240; and Richard 
B. Latner, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson. White House Politics, 1829-1837 (Athens, Ga. 
1979), 152-154. 
30 For the Georgia-New Jersey connection, see Ellis, Union at Risk, 149-150. The 
absence of a paper trail from Van Buren is unsurprising, given that Van Buren was in 
Albany for much of the fall of 1832, and consequently was in a position to 
communicate personally with Marcy (who was occasionally in the capital after the 
elections) and leading members of the legislature. 
31 Charles Z. Lincoln, comp., Messages From the Governors ... 1823-1842 (Albany, 
N.Y. 1909), 422-424. Benjamin Butler followed up on the governor's message by 
writing privately to Southard-now Governor of New Jersey-that New York would 
be willing to negotiate seriously if New Jersey agreed to postpone any court proceeding 
for one year. Butler to Southard, Jan. 3, 1833, Southard Papers. 
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views such as New York was taking in this controversy? The answer 
lay less in the politics of nullification or the Court's current posture 
than Wirt's sober assessment of the future composition of the Court. 
New Yorkers well understood, Wirt said, that New Jersey "has no 
hope for success but before the present judges of the Supreme Court." 
But with several visibly aging justices on the high bench, change that 
did not favor New Jersey lay ahead. As Wirt put it, "every probability 
is in favor of a states' rights chief justice, ere long." Such a change in 
personnel, long promised by President Jackson, "must inevitably lead to 
the dismission of our bill, by the denial of the jurisdiction of the 
court. ' 32 
Wirt emphasized that he was simply being realistic. The Court was 
at this time closely divided, and two of its leading nationalists could 
depart the bench at any time. They were certain to be replaced by 
states' rights jurists appointed by Andrew Jackson. Chief Justice 
Marshall, seventy-seven years old and in uncertain health, talked 
periodically about retirement. Another nationalist, Justice William 
Johnson, was visibly failing. If either man resigned or died before the 
New York-New Jersey case was decided, Wirt expected a Jacksonian 
Democrat from Virginia, Philip P. Barbour, "or some other anti-court 
partisan" to be appointed. Then, Wirt observed, "the last spark of 
hope w[oul]d be extinguished in that quarter. New Jersey w[oul]d then 
have to take arms against the giant state-and if it came to that issue, 
may they prove to be the Heaven directed arms of David."33 New 
Jersey's most practical option was to settle out of court, said Wirt. 
Marcy's conciliatory tone in his recent annual message had sent the 
right signal. It would be foolish for New Jersey to reject this overture 
out of simple pride. Act now, he counseled, while there was a chance to 
do so. 
32 Wirt to Southard, Jan. 11, 1833, ibid. A year earlier, following New York's 
request for more time to prepare its case, Wirt had written to his co-counsel Samuel 
Southard that such "delay is full of danger." Wirt added that the complexion of the 
Court could change to NewJersey's disadvantage. Wirt to Southard, Feb. 8, 1832, ibid. 
33 Wirt to Southard, Jan. 11, 1833, ibid. On Marshall's health and outlook in 
1832, see Leonard Baker, John Marshall. A Life in Law (New York 1974), 742, 746- 
750, 764. Johnson's skein of physical ailments, beginning in 1831 and culminating in 
his death following an operation in early 1835, is treated in White, The Marshall 
Court, 343. Yet another Supreme Court judge, Henry Baldwin, was mentally ill, and 
there was speculation about his future on the Court; ibid., 194n., 299. For an 
overview of Andrew Jackson's commitment to reshaping the federal judiciary in a 
states' rights direction, see Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History 
of Appointments to the Supreme Court (2d ed., New York 1985), 94-102. 
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Wirt's argument resonated with Southard despite the latter's 
inclination to let the Jacksonians suffer the consequences of their 
ideological schizophrenia. Southard respected Wirt's opinion, feared 
Wirt's predictions might come true, and in the end, believed that 
settling this long-standing dispute, promptly, made more sense than 
risking everything by putting hopes in a continued nationalist majority 
on the Supreme Court. At the same time, New Jersey Jacksonians 
understood that continuing their lawsuit could only lend moral support 
to the nullificationists and fracture their party.34 
In view of the Jacksonians' quandary over states' rights, Southard 
had more leverage to ease tensions with New York, and he took 
advantage of it. Within days of receiving Marcy's letter, Southard 
penned a cautiously optimistic response, reminding New York that it 
had to approach negotiations with a true compromising spirit or 
progress would be impossible. Specifically, Southard noted that the 
central issue to be resolved remained the eastern boundary, and in 
particular New Jersey's insistence on a line in the middle of all waters 
between the states.35 
By late February, each state had passed measures authorizing yet 
another formal boundary negotiation. Commissioners were appointed, 
and when they met during the late summer of 1833, they quickly 
reached a compromise resembling New Jersey's fallback position of 
1828. Specifically, the nautical boundary between the two states was set 
in the middle of the waters between them. New York retained its 
jurisdiction over Barlow's and Ellis Islands; New Jersey would 
maintain exclusive jurisdiction over all wharves, docks and 
improvements on its own shores; New Jersey would repudiate its 
claims to Staten Island; the two states were to have equal rights on the 
34 Unlike the tepid response to President Jackson's nullification proclamation 
among New York Jacksonians, most Jersey Democrats applauded the president and 
chided Southard when he would not fully endorse Jackson's constitutional theory. 
See Birkner, Southard, 139-140; and Herbert Ershkowitz, The Origin of the Whig and 
Democratic Parties: NewJersey Politics, 1820-1837 (Washington, D.C. 1982), 162. 
35 Southard's reply to Marcy is not in his papers at Princeton University; 
presumably it followed the lines of his positive private response to Benjamin F. 
Butler, Jan. 9, 1833, Southard Papers. See also Theodore Frelinghuysen to 
Southard, Feb. 10, 1833, and Southard to William L. Marcy, Feb. 26, 1833, ibid. 
Southard's appointment of commissioners was one of his last acts as governor, since 
he resigned in late February, barely two months into his term as governor, to take a 
seat in the United States Senate. 
210 
This content downloaded from 138.234.153.138 on Wed, 26 Jun 2013 11:51:46 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
NEW YORK-NEW JERSEY CONTROVERSY 211 
service of process within the other's jurisdiction under specific 
circumstances.36 
The essential reasonableness of the settlement was reflected in the 
lack of complaint or bragging on either side. Several New Jersey 
partisans grumbled that the case should have been carried to 
conclusion before the Supreme Court, but the general attitude 
expressed was relief. In New York, Governor Marcy's annual message 
in 1834 offered a terse endorsement of the settlement, arguing that it 
was "compatible with our honor and our interest." 37 Both state 
legislatures promptly ratified the agreement, as did the United States 
Congress. A long friction between New York and New Jersey was now 
eased. 
Suspension of the lawsuit with New Jersey in early 1833, like the 
delicately contrived settlement Van Buren had encouraged in the 
aftermath of Marshall's judgment in Worcester v. Georgia, simplified the 
Jackson administration's position in the nullification crisis. Jackson 
could now more readily seek congressional authority to use force 
against South Carolina without being embarrassed by the existence of a 
36 Acts of the Fifty Eighth General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, 2nd Sitting 
(Trenton, N. J. 1834), 118-121. Marcy wrote to Southard's replacement as 
governor, Elias Seeley, seeking support for the appointment of Benjamin Butler as a 
boundary commissioner and was evidently told this would be acceptable. See Marcy 
to "Governor of New Jersey," Mar. 2, 1833, William L. Marcy Papers (Library of 
Congress). Correspondence between the New York governor and other boundary 
commissioners can be found in Marcy to A. Jay, Mar. 5, 1833, and Henry Seymour 
to Marcy, Mar. 14, 1833, ibid. These letters suggest no agenda beyond reaching a 
satisfactory compromise. Background materials on the dates of the meetings of the 
commissioners are in James Parker's memo, "Of my attendance as a Commissioner 
to Settle the Line Between New York & New Jersey," James Parker Papers (Special 
Collections Department, Rutgers University Library, New Brunswick). On the 
exchange of official documents confirming the compact, see Peter Vroom to James 
Parker, Feb. 10, 1834, ibid.; James Parker to Peter Vroom, Mar. 7, 1834 and 
Vroom to William D. Marcy, Mar. 10, 1834, Peter D. Vroom Papers (Rare Book 
and Manuscript Library, Columbia University). The final folder in the Philhower 
Collection Box, marked "Vroom-Wall-Rhea-Trenton Militia" (Rutgers University 
Library), contains a draft of Vroom's letter to President Andrew Jackson, Mar. 20, 
1834, enclosing a copy of the agreement between New York and New Jersey. 
37 Lincoln, comp., Messages From the Governors, 1823-1842, 442. Examples of 
letters from leading New Jersey political figures emphasizing the benefits of fighting 
the case in Court include Lewis Condict to Southard, Jan. 21, 1833, and Theodore 
Frelinghuysen to Southard, Jan. 11, 1833, Southard Papers. Benjamin F. Butler, 
who served on the boundary commission of 1833, privately pronounced the 
settlement "good & right." See Butler to Harriet Butler, Sept. 18, 1833, Butler 
Family Papers (Firestone Library). 
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controversy between two important states and another branch of the 
federal government.38 To be sure, the dragon of nullification was not 
destroyed, but neither was it triumphant. With the canny and 
constructive intervention of Henry Clay, a true compromise was 
forged, offering something important to each of the antagonists.39 Not 
least important, the Jacksonian coalition remained intact, South 
Carolina was pacified, a moderate states' rights doctrine held sway 
among Democrats, and the Marshall Court avoided any damaging 
blow to its authority. 
Set in this context, the New York-New Jersey boundary 
controversy transcended its inherently parochial nature. Studying New 
Jersey v. New York in terms of national controversies helps clarify 
Martin Van Buren's sense of discomfort in the fall of 1832, following 
his election as vice president. It suggests how politically sensitive and 
adept John Marshall was towards the end of his tenure in office. And it 
underscores the difficulties Jackson faced in holding the line against 
South Carolina's challenge to federal authority. Had New York 
Democrats not been positioned to support the president's stance 
against nullification, pressure would have intensified for Jackson to ally 
more formally with his erstwhile National Republican foes, and the 
Union cause would have been even more clearly at risk.40 
38 Miles, "After John Marshall's Decision," 541. Ellis, Union at Risk, 147-156, 
illuminates the New York states' rights position by describing the Regency's 
confused reaction and varied response to Jackson's nullification proclamation and his 
Force Bill message. 39 Harry Watson, author of the best recent overview of Jacksonian politics, 
notes that the compromise of 1833 "gave substantive relief to the South, at a pace 
that manufacturers could bear, and gave unionists a symbolic assertion of federal 
supremacy in the Force Act." Watson, Liberty and Power, 129. For William W. 
Freehling's recent reassertion that Jackson emerged triumphant in the nullification 
crisis, see The Road to Disunion. Secessionists a  Bay, 1776-1854 (New York 1990), esp. 
281-286. 
40 See Norman D. Brown, Daniel Webster and the Politics of Availability (Athens 
1969), 15-52; Sydney Nathans, Daniel Webster and Jacksonian Democracy (Baltimore 
1973), 48-73; Maurice G. Baxter, One and Inseparable: Daniel Webster and the Union 
(Cambridge, Mass. 1984), 220-222; and Remini, Jackson and the Course of American 
Democracy, 9-10, 35-37. 
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